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The Effect of Private Health Insurance on Medical Care 
Utilization and Self-Assessed Health in Germany
* 
 
In Germany, employees are generally obliged to participate in the public health insurance 
system, where coverage is universal, co-payments and deductibles are moderate, and 
premia are based on income. However, they may buy private insurance instead if their 
income exceeds the compulsory insurance threshold. Here, premia are based on age and 
health, individuals may choose to what extent they are covered, and deductibles and co-
payments are common. In this paper, we estimate the effect of private insurance coverage on 
the number of doctor visits, the number of nights spent in a hospital and self-assessed 
health. Variation in income around the compulsory insurance threshold provides a natural 
experiment that we exploit to control for selection into private insurance. We document that 
income is measured with error and suggest an approach to take this into account. We find 
negative effects of private insurance coverage on the number of doctor visits, no effects on 
the number of nights spent in a hospital, and positive effects on health. 
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In Germany, employees aregenerally obliged toparticipatein thepublichealth insurancesystem,
where coverage is universal, co-payments and deductibles are moderate, and premia are based on
income. However, they may buy private insurance instead if their income exceeds the so-called
compulsory insurance threshold.1 Here, premia are based on age and health, individuals may
choose to what extent they are covered, and deductibles and co-payments are common.2 These
differences in the incentivestructure may affect both health behavior and the demand for medical
care. In particular, because of the higher co-payments and deductibles, privately insured patients
have stronger incentives to invest in prevention to decrease the likelihood of occurrence of an
illness. Therefore, even in case the treatment provided to privately and publicly insured patients
is exactly the same, we would expect privately insured patients to be less inclined to demand
medical services.
An important difference affecting the supply of services is that for the same treatment the
compensation doctors receive for privately insured patients is, on average, 2.3 times as high as
the compensation for publicly insured patients (Walendzik et al., 2008). Therefore, doctors have
an incentive to treat privately insured patients ﬁrst, and more intensely, possibly providing better
treatment (Jürges, 2009). For example, waiting times for privately insured patients are lower on
average (Lungen et al., 2008). This may in turn affect the demand for medical care.
The combination of demand and supply side incentives determines whether the amount of
servicesconsumedishigherorlowerforprivatelyinsuredindividuals,and whicheffect insurance
type has on health. Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether more or less services are
consumed and how health depends on insurance status.
In this paper, we study the effect of being privately insured on the number of doctor visits,
1About 90 percent of the German population is insured in the public health insurance system. Most remaining
individuals buy private insurance (Colombo & Tapay, 2004).
2In our data (the sample also used for Tables 2 and 3 below), 70 percent of the privately insured individuals who
answered the respective question have insurance contracts that involve deductibles or co-payments.
2the number of nights spent in a hospital and self-assessed health. We do not estimate the effects
of speciﬁc insurance characteristics but interpret the results in light of the fact that deductibles
and co-payments are common features of private insurance contracts. An unusual feature of
the German health insurance system allows us to control for selection into private insurance:
as soon as income in the last year exceeds the so-called compulsory insurance threshold, indi-
viduals become eligible to opt out of the public health insurance system and may buy private
insurance instead. Random variation in income around this compulsory insurance threshold gen-
erates a natural experiment that allows us to conduct a regression discontinuity (RD) analysis
and estimate the effect of private insurance for those individuals who buy private insurance once
becoming eligible.3 This local average treatment effect is interesting to policymakers consider-
ing to increase the compulsory insurance threshold because such an increase would force exactly
those individuals for whom we estimate the effect to be publicly insured.
We use survey data from the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) for our analysis be-
cause German administrative data, that contain accurate income measures, do not contain health
related information. In the data, we ﬁnd direct evidence for measurement error in income. More-
over, we ﬁnd that there is a sizable number of individuals who, according to their reported in-
come, are not eligible to buy private insurance but at the same time report to be privately insured.
The methodological contribution in this paper is to model the measurement error in the so-called
forcing variable, income in our case, within the RD framework. This then allows us to estimate
the effects of interest.
Controlling for selection into private insurance we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative effects of being
privately insured on the number of doctor visits for those individuals who visit the doctor at least
once in a three month period. At the same time, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effects on the number of
3The RD approach has been suggested by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) and has recently been developed
by Hahn et al. (2001). They show that under relatively mild assumptions the RD method can be interpreted as a
local randomized experiment. This gives the results a strong internal validity. However, in general, a drawback is
that the effect is only estimated for a small subset of the population of interest/the population that a social planner
is concerned with. See also Imbens and Lemieux (2008), Lee and Lemieux (2009) and Van der Klaauw (2009) for
recent discussions. Our setup is the same as in Battistin et al. (2009).
3nights spent in a hospital, which can arguably be inﬂuenced less by the individual, and positive
effects on self-assessed health. This suggests that privately insured patients receive better or
more intense treatment each time they see a doctor, or that they invest more in prevention.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 discuss related re-
sults and the institutional details, respectively. In Section 4, we provide information on the data
and document that there is measurement error in income. Section 5 discusses the econometric
approach, emphasizing our approach to modeling measurement error. Results are presented in
Section 6, and a sensitivity analysis is performed in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The empirical literature on demand for health services dates back at least to the 1970s when the
RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) was conducted. One important ﬁnding is that the
use of medical services responds negatively to changes in cost sharing, with a stronger effect for
outpatient care than for inpatient care (Newhouse, 1974; Manning et al., 1987).
There are at least four studies for Germany that relate demand for medical services to in-
surance type. They all use the GSOEP data. Geil et al. (1997) estimate a count data model
for hospital visits on data from 1984-1989, 1992, and 1994. They ﬁnd no relationship between
insurance coverage and the hospitalization decision. Riphahn et al. (2003) estimate a bivariate
count data model for physician and hospital visits. They use data from 1984 through 1995 and
ﬁnd that neither hospital nights nor doctor visits depend on the insurance type of the individual.
Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995) and Jürges (2009) both estimate a negative binomial hurdle model.
Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995) use data from 1985 and ﬁnd that privately insured individuals are
less likely to contact a general practitioner but the number of visits once they do so is not signif-
icantly different from the one for publicly insured patients. Jürges (2009) uses data from 2002
and ﬁnds that privately insured individuals are less likely to visit a doctor at all, but given that
4they do the number of doctor visits is signiﬁcantly larger than that of patients covered by public
health insurance. All four papers have in common that they do not control for selection into
private insurance.4
3 Institutional details
In Germany, about 90% of the population is publicly insured (Colombo & Tapay, 2004). Buying
public insurance is mandatory for dependent employees as long as their income does not exceed
the so-called compulsory insurance threshold. The public insurance premium equals a certain
percentage (nowadays about 15 percent that are equally shared between the employer and the
employee) of gross income up to the so-called contribution ceiling, and equal to it thereafter.5
Table 1 shows the contribution ceilings and the compulsory insurance thresholds by the year
in which the income was earned. To see how the system works consider an individual whose
income, including all extra payments, in 2000 was 40,000 Euros. Then, he is eligible to buy
private insurance in 2001 because his income exceeded 39,574 Euros, the compulsory insurance
threshold. If his income stays the same or decreases in 2001, then he will have to join the public
insurance system again in 2002 because the compulsory insurance threshold is 40,034 Euros for
income earned in 2001. He can apply for an exemption if he loses eligibility solely due to the
increaseinthecompulsoryinsurancethreshold,i.e. ifhisincomein2001isatleast39,574Euros.
This applies to very few individuals in our data, about a tenth of a percent of all individual-year
observations, and we therefore abstract from this exemption in the remainder.6
4The ﬁrst two papers allow for random effects. Until recently both the theoretical and the empirical literature on
informational asymmetries focused on adverse selection and moral hazard (Akerlof, 1970; Rothschild & Stiglitz,
1976; Arrow, 1963). However, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) and Fang et al. (2008) point out that there might be
advantageous selection instead. Their explanation is that “good risks” select into insurance because they are more
risk averse and therefore value insurance more than “bad risks” do.
5See Jürges (2009) and the references therein for more details on this and the following discussion.
6This is because income typically increases faster than the compulsory insurance threshold. Sozialgesetzbuch V
§8also deﬁnestwomoresituationsinwhichexemptionsaregranted,namelyatemporaryreductioninworkinghours
and a combination of part-time employment and paternity leave. We abstract also from these possibilities because
they are not widely used. If, to the contrary, the number of individuals who would be granted an exemption was
5Table 1: Contribution ceiling and compulsory insurance threshold
Year Contribution Compulsory insurance Mean
ceiling threshold income
1994 34,968 34,968 24,633
1995 35,892 35,892 25,126
1996 36,816 36,816 25,905
1997 37,728 37,728 26,423
1998 38,652 38,652 26,660
1999 39,108 39,108 27,060
2000 39,574 39,574 27,358
2001 40,034 40,034 27,741
2002 40,500 40,500 28,231
2003 41,400 45,900 28,626
2004 41,850 46,350 28,938
2005 42,300 46,800 29,060
Reported for West Germany by year in which the income was
earned. Amounts are nominal amounts per year and in Euros. The
contribution ceilings and the compulsory insurance thresholds are
based on Sozialgesetzbuch V and own calculations. Mean income
is taken from Sozialgesetzbuch VI, Anlage 1.
It isingeneraldifﬁculttogetback intothepublichealthinsurancesystem. Onceanindividual
has bought privatehealth insurance he can only get back into the publicsystem when he becomes
unemployed(providedthatheis youngerthan55)orwhenhisincomefalls belowthecompulsory
insurance threshold (Colombo & Tapay, 2004).
Duetoareformthecompulsoryinsurancethresholdincreasedsubstantiallyforincomeearned
in 2003 and later. A special rule applied to individuals who actually bought private insurance in
2003, but who were not eligible for this anymore according to the new thresholds. They could
still buy private insurance provided that their income is at least equal to the contribution ceiling,
which increased only moderately.7
large, say 1 percent of all individuals, then we would overestimatethe discontinuity in the probabilityto be privately
insured at the compulsoryinsurance threshold by 1 percentage point because we assume that this probability is zero
for individuals earning less than the compulsory insurance threshold, and we would therefore underestimate the
local average treatment effects. It follows from equation (1) below that we would overestimate the effect by about 5
percent if the discontinuity in the denominator was, e.g., 19 instead of 20 percent.
7We excluded these individuals from the empirical analysis.
6Contributions for private health insurance are mainly based on health and age, so buying
private insurance is especially attractive for young individuals. As a consequence of this, and
because of the fact that private insurers are allowed to reject individuals, the risk pool of the
private insurers is much better than in the public system.
Coverage is universal in the public system. Deductibles and co-payments are limited. Pri-
vately insured individuals can buy better care, e.g. treatment by the head doctor in a hospital
or a single room in a hospital, but this comes at a higher price. Deductibles and co-payments
are much more common, and many insurers offer a rebate if an individual did not use medical
services in the past calendar year. Unfortunately, speciﬁc characteristics of private insurance are
not recorded in our data.
At this point it is worth noticing that there is a feature called family insurance in the German
public health insurance system. A spouse is automatically insured if an individualis insured. For
thisitismandatorythatthespouseisnotfulltimeself-employedandthatthespousedoesnotearn
more than a rather low speciﬁed amount. If a married man is working then this system generates
incentives against working for his wife because then she would have to pay contributions which
amount to about 7.5 percent of her gross wage (the employer matches this and pays about the
same amount to the system). The family insurance feature does not exist for private health
insurance and therefore, individual insurance has to be purchased for each family member.
As already pointed out before insurance status has important consequences for the com-
pensation of doctors. For a given treatment the compensation doctors receive for privately in-
sured patients is, on average, 2.3 times as high as the compensation for publicly insured patients
(Walendzik et al., 2008). Furthermore, there is indirect evidence that doctors face strong time
constraints when treating patients. The consultation length for the average (publicly insured)
individual is very low in Germany.8 Deveugele et al. (2002, Table 4) compare the average con-
sultationlengthforgeneral practitionersin sixcountriesand ﬁnd thatwith7.6minutesitislowest
8Recall that about 90 percent of the individuals are publicly insured. See footnote 1.
7in Germany. It is highest in Switzerland, where it is equal to 15.6 minutes. Together with the
differences in the compensationthis suggests that doctors dedicate more timeto privately insured
patients.
4 Data
The GSOEP we use in this study contain information at the individual level on medical care
utilization, self-assessed health, and background variables. We analyze data from West Germany
for the period from 1995 to 2006.9
Our sample is constructed such that eligibility to opt out of the public insurance system is
exclusively determined by income. Unemployed individuals who receive unemployment bene-
ﬁts are required to be in the public health insurance system. For them there is no way to opt
out and therefore they are excluded. Self-employed, civil servants, soldiers, teachers in private
schools and students are not required to be in the public system, even if their income is below
the compulsory insurance threshold. Hence, eligibility does not depend on income and therefore
they are excluded from the sample as well. Retired individuals, who receive a public pension,
are required to have public health insurance. They may opt out if insurance was not mandatory
in at least ﬁve years after the age of 55 and most of the time before that. Hence eligibility is
only weakly related to income and therefore they are excluded. Individuals of age 55 and older
are excluded for two reasons. First, because for them various ways to opt for (early) retirement
exist. Second, because for them it is difﬁcult to get back into the public health insurance system.
Individuals under the age of 25 are excluded because a large fraction of them is covered by their
parents’ insurance.
9We do not use data before1995because the questionon the numberof doctor visits was phrased differently. We
use data only up to 2006 because from 2007 onwards individuals had to earn more than the compulsory insurance
threshold in three consecutive years in order to be eligible to buy private insurance. East German individuals have
been excluded because it turned out that for them, even when we control for measurement error in income, there is
no jump in the probability to be privately insured when income is equal to the compulsory insurance threshold.
8To summarize, our study population consists of West German individuals, aged 25 to 55,
with a regular employment contract for whom eligibility to opt out of the public health insurance
system is exclusively determined by income.
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for the variables we use in the analysis. The ﬁrst set of
rows contains the outcome variables.10 Eligible (to buy private insurance) and privately insured
individuals visit the doctor slightly less often, and report to be in slightly better health. They
report to be less likely to stay in a hospital and to spend less nights in a hospital on average.
The second set of rows contains summary statistics for individual characteristics. Gross
income is, by construction, on average higher for eligibles. In light of this it is not surprising that
it is higherfor privatelyinsured(because only thosewith highenough incomes are eligibleto buy
private insurance). The remaining rows are informative about selection into private insurance.
Given the characteristics of public and private insurance it is relatively more attractive to buy
private insurance for individuals who are not married. This is because spouses whose income is
relatively low are automatically covered by the insurance of the individual. This is reﬂected by
the fact that privately insured individuals are less likely to be married. They are older and better
educated.
One key variable in our analysis is gross yearly income. This is not reported by the GSOEP
respondents but constructed from their reports on their average gross monthly income in the
previous year and their reports on supplementary income such as 13th month salary, 14th month
salary, Christmas bonus, vacation pay, proﬁt share, premia, and bonuses. Using self-reported
income and Table 1 we can compute the eligibility status for every individual.
Table 3 shows that there is a sizable number of individuals, 577, who, according to their
reportedincome, arenoteligibletobuyprivateinsurance, butatthesametimereporttohavedone
so. These 577 individuals constitute 20 percent of the individuals with private health insurance.
10For the self-assessed health question, ‘bad’ is re-coded as a 1, ‘poor’ as 2, and so on, up to ‘very good’ as 5.
Hence, a positive association between health and private insurance would be reﬂected in a positive coefﬁcient on an
indicator for private insurance in an ordinary least squares regression.
9Table 2: Descriptive statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public Private
Ineligible Eligible insurance insurance Total
At least 1 doctor visit 0.619 0.594 0.611 0.521 0.613
- - - - -
Doctor visits given at least 1 visit 3.304 2.920 3.243 2.904 3.223
(4.212) (3.365) (4.094) (3.287) (4.052)
Doctor visits 2.045 1.733 1.999 1.651 1.977
(3.682) (2.963) (3.581) (2.866) (3.541)
At least 1 night in hospital 0.079 0.065 0.078 0.057 0.076
- - - - -
Nights in hospital 0.862 0.655 0.833 0.572 0.613
(5.027) (4.033) (4.844) (4.603) (4.830)
Self-assessed health 3.585 3.696 3.596 3.799 3.609
(0.850) (0.790) (0.841) (0.777) (0.838)
Gross income 23,914.80 61,249.00 29,879.10 63,515.70 31,998.60
(9,693.90) (27,755.60) (18,005.30) (41,082.40) (21,837.50)
Years of education 11.533 13.971 11.881 14.785 12.065
(2.228) (2.929) (2.471) (2.945) (2.601)
Married 0.654 0.746 0.676 0.649 0.674
- - - - -
Male 0.500 0.848 0.562 0.784 0.576
- - - - -
Age 39.393 42.161 39.872 41.775 39.992
(8.338) (7.206) (8.229) (7.274) (8.186)
N 35,822 9,900 42,841 2,881 45,722
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses). For binary variables only proportions are shown.
Sample consists of dependent employees for whom eligibility to opt out of the public health insur-
ance system is exclusively determined by income. t-tests show that for all variables the difference
in the mean between ineligible and eligible individuals and between publicly insured and privately
insured individuals signiﬁcantly different from zero.
Misreporting insurance status or measurement error in income may both be valid explanations
for this.11
We consider it to be more plausible that income is measured with error because income is a
real number, and may thus be recalled with errors, whereas insurancestatus is more easily known
11There is an extensive literature on measurement error in income, see for example Bound et al. (2001) for a
survey. In order to study the accuracy of survey reports, they are typically compared with either employers’ or
administrative records. Some studies ﬁnd that survey reports are highly correlated with record values, while others
ﬁnd much lower correlations. The mean of survey reports is foundto be close to the mean of the record values. That
is, under- or over-reporting,if present, is found to be moderate on average.
10Table 3: Eligibility and health insurance type
Public insurance Private insurance N
Ineligible 35,245 577 35,822
Eligible 7,596 2,304 9,900
N 42,841 2,881 45,722
Sample consists of dependent employees for whom eligi-
bility to opt out of the public health insurance system is
exclusively determined by income.
because it is typically either public or private insurance. Moreover, there is direct evidence for
measurement error in income because the GSOEP questionnaire asks respondents twice about
their monthly income in a given year.12 In particular, respondents are asked about the income
they received in the preceding month (without extra payments) and about their average monthly
income in the previous year. This provides us with two measures of monthly income for the
same year. If both income reports would be reported without any error, and if the within year
variance in monthly income is low, then both measures should be close to one another. That is,
the data points in a scatter plot should be close to the 45 degree line. Such a scatter plot is shown
in Figure 1. The deviations from the 45 degree line are substantial. This strongly suggests that
there is measurement error in income.13
5 Econometric approach
Let (yi(0),yi(1)) be the pair of potential outcomes for each member i of the study population.
In our case yi(0) denotes the health outcome individual i would experience in case public health
insurance was assigned to him and yi(1) denotes the health outcome individual i would experi-
12This is not the case for the total yearly incomethat we use to determineeligibility. Yearly incomeincludes extra
payments such as holiday pay. The fact that it is yearly income and not monthly income that determines eligibility
is the reason that we do not exploit the availability of two monthly income measures in the main analysis.
13This is robust to controlling for working hours and job changes by means of a regression. The R2 in this
regression is 0.846, meaning that 15.4 percent of the variation in the report of previous year’s average income
remains unexplained.
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Current year’s report of last year’s average monthly income
Sample consists of dependent employees for whom eligi-
bility to opt out of the public health insurance system is
exclusively determined by income. For this ﬁgure we use
only income reports below 15,000 Euros per month.
ence if private health insurance was assigned. That is, we consider private health insurance to be
the “treatment.”
An individual is eligible to buy private health insurance instead of public insurance if his
income in the previous year exceeded the respective compulsory insurance threshold. That is, an
individual is eligible when z∗
i ≥ 0, where z∗
i denotes the difference between income earned in the
previous year and the corresponding compulsory insurance threshold. Buying private insurance
is voluntary for eligible individuals so that some will buy it while others will not.
Following Hahn et al. (2001) we make three assumptions. First, we assume that the effect
of private insurance is independent of z∗
i around z∗
i = 0. This assumption is plausible as long as
variation in income is independent of the effect of private insurance. It could be violated if indi-
viduals were to manipulate their income such that they become eligible to buy private insurance
and the effect of private insurance was different for those individuals. To the best of our knowl-
12edge there is no evidence for such manipulations in Germany. Second, we assume that the mean
value of yi(0) conditional on z∗
i is a continuous function of z∗
i at z∗
i = 0. This assumption holds
if the mean health outcome would be a smooth function in income around the compulsory in-
surance threshold once public insurance was exogenously assigned to everybody. This is highly
plausible. Third, we assume that the decision to buy private insurance is monotone in eligibility.
This is the monotonicity condition of Imbens and Angrist (1994). It holds by construction be-
cause ineligibles cannot buy private insurance. Under these assumptions the average treatment
effect for those individuals that would buy private health insurance when becoming eligible is
given by
DLATE ≡ E(yi(1)−yi(0)|pi = 1,z∗







i = 0+  , (1)
where yi is the observed health outcome, pi is an indicator of private insurance, E(·|z∗
i = 0+) ≡
limd↓0E(·|z∗
i = d), and E(·|z∗
i = 0−) ≡ limd↑0E(·|z∗
i = d). This effect is of particular interest
because it is directly related to the question what the effect of requiring all individuals with
incomes slightly above the compulsory insurance threshold to buy public insurance would be.
Measurement error in income leads to misclassiﬁcation of eligibility. Importantly, this mis-
classiﬁcation is not independent of the true underlying income because if the true underlying
income is below (above) the compulsory insurance threshold the classiﬁcation error can only
be that the individual is (not) eligible to buy private insurance. This precludes the use of an
instrumental variables approach to estimating the unknown quantities in the numerator and de-
nominator in equation (1).
The effect of the measurement error in income on estimates of these quantities is that no
discontinuity in reported income is observed at the threshold (Battistin et al., 2009). In Figure
2, the dots are fractions of privately insured individuals, which we plot against the difference
in income and the compulsory insurance threshold. The ﬁgure shows that these fractions are
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Sample consists of dependent employees for whom eligibility to opt out of the public health in-
surance system is exclusively determined by income and who earn between 15,000 Euros less and
25,000 Euros more than the compulsory insurance threshold (N = 24,203). The speciﬁcation here
imposes, for illustration, that the size of the discontinuity is the same in all years.
not zero if reported income is below the compulsory insurance threshold, i.e. if the value of
the difference on the horizontal axis is negative, and that indeed there is no discontinuity in the
fraction of privately insured at the threshold.
Towards estimating the local average treatment effect in the presence of measurement error
we now develop an expression for the probability to be privately insured, which is equal to the
conditional expectation of the indicator for being privately insured. Our approach is parametric
and our main assumption is that z∗
i = zi−ui, where ui is normally distributed independent of zi
and has mean zero and variance s2
u.14 Furthermore, ui is assumed to be independent of private
14Notably, this is not classical measurement error. For classical measurement error we have zi = z∗
i +ui, which is
equivalent, but we assume that ui is independent of z∗
i , and not of zi. See Wooldridge (2002) for a discussion.











Recall that when true income is below the compulsory insurance threshold, i.e. when z∗
i < 0,
then the probability of being privately insured is zero because ineligibles may not buy private
insurance. Conversely, when true income exceeds the compulsory insurance threshold, i.e. when
z∗
i ≥ 0, individuals may buy private insurance.





















where F(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and f (·) is the standard nor-
mal probability density function. Notably, this is the prediction for the relationship between the
probability to be privately insured and the difference between reported income and the compul-
sory insurance threshold, zi. The solid line in Figure 2 shows the estimated relationship for our
data when we pool data across all years. The dots are sample fractions of privately insured.
Comparing them to the solid line shows that the ﬁt is reasonably good. Finally, the dashed line in
this ﬁgure is the underlying relationship between the probability to be privately insured and the
difference between actual (measured without error) yearly income and the compulsory insurance
threshold, z∗
i .
A similar expression can be obtained for E(yi|zi). This involves specifying different linear





















































The parameters forboth E(pi|zi) and E(yi|zi) are jointlyestimatedusing thefeasible general-
ized nonlinear least squares estimator for nonlinear systems of equations. From these parameter
estimates we then calculate the local average treatment effect. For this observe that a, a0, and
a1 are equal to E(pi|z∗
i = 0+), E(yi|z∗
i = 0−), and E(yi|z∗
i = 0+), respectively. Hence, it follows







income, equation (2), and the equation for medical care utilization conditional on reported in-
come, equation (3). Throughout, we allow the probability to be privately insured to have year
speciﬁc jumps at the compulsory insurance threshold. This is reasonable since the compulsory
insurance threshold changed over time (see Table 1). We impose that the local average treatment
effect is the same in all years, i.e. we impose that DLATE, our parameter of main interest, is not
only locally independent of z∗
i , but over a whole range of values. Then, it follows from equation
(4) that we can replace a1 by a0+DLATE ·a. Notice that the size of both the numerator and the
denominator in equation (1) is still allowed to vary across years, but we impose that the relative
change in both is the same. Finally, we impose that expected health outcomes do not depend on
16income, i.e. b0 = b1 = 0.15
We ﬁrst estimate equation (2) alone. Results are reported in Table 4.16 Coefﬁcient estimates
are marginal effects because the underlying model is a linear probability model. The probability
is zero for negative z∗
i and for positive z∗
i it is linear in it. The results indicate that for all years
there is a discontinuous jump in the probability to buy private insurance at z∗
i = 0. In 1995,
the size of the jump is 9 percentage points, in 1996 it is 6 percentage points. From 1997 to
2001 the jump is about 10 percentage points. In 2002 and 2003, the jump increases slightly,
and between 2004 and 2006 the jump substantially increases to approximately 18 percentage
points. Supposedly, this is due to the increase in the compulsory insurance threshold for income
earned in 2003, which affects the jump in the probability to be privately insured in 2004. For
all individuals in our estimation sample the predicted value for the probability to be privately
insured is between 0 and 1.
Table 5 presents the estimates of DLATE for doctor visits in the past three months, the number
of nights spent in a hospital, and self-assessed health. The respective baseline outcome is the av-
erage outcome for publicly insured individuals for whom true income is equal to the compulsory
insurance threshold.
In speciﬁcation (1), we use an indicator for at least one doctor visit as the dependent variable.
This is a linear probability model since the expected outcome is a probability. 60.6 percent of
the publicly insured individuals see a doctor at least once within a three month period. We ﬁnd
no signiﬁcant effect of private insurance on this. In speciﬁcation (2), we estimate the effect of
private insurance on the number of doctor visits for those individuals who visit a doctor at least
once. The baseline outcome is 3.329 doctor visits. The effect of private insurance on this is
estimated to be negative and signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. The estimated magnitude of the
15We conductedseveral robustness checks. By jointly estimating moregeneral models(involvingnon-zeroslopes
that were allowed to differ across years, e.g.) and our baseline speciﬁcation we could check, respectively, whether
treatment effect estimates were signiﬁcantly different from the ones obtained using the baseline speciﬁcation, and
in general they were not.
16Estimates are very similar when we estimate equations (2) and (3) together.
17Table 4: Probability to be privately insured






























Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and
shown in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the
10, 5, and 1 % level, respectively. Sample consists of de-
pendent employees for whom eligibility to opt out of the
public health insurance system is exclusively determined
by income and who earn between 15,000 Euros less and
25,000 Euros more than the compulsory insurance thresh-
old.
effect, however, seems to be too big. Speciﬁcation (3) is for the number of doctor visits in the
entire sample. This is a combination of the two effects we discussed above. The mean baseline
18Table 5: Baseline speciﬁcation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
At least one Doctor visits Doctor visits At least one night Nights in Self-assessed
doctor visits for subsample in hospital hospital health
DLATE -0.079 -3.746*** -2.137*** -0.063* -1.084* 0.449***
(0.076) (0.945) (0.546) (0.035) (0.572) (0.160)
Baseline outcome 0.606*** 3.329*** 2.013*** 0.074*** 0.783*** 3.614***
(0.005) (0.054) (0.039) (0.002) (0.039) (0.011)
N 24,203 14,579 24,203 24,203 24,203 24,203
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and shown in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗denote signiﬁcance at the 10,
5, and 1 % level, respectively. Sample consists of dependent employees for whom eligibility to opt out of the public
health insurance system is exclusively determined by income and who earn between 15,000 Euros less and 25,000
Euros more than the compulsory insurance threshold.
outcome is estimated to be 2.013. The estimated effect is negativeand signiﬁcant at the 1 percent
level, but again the magnitude of the point estimate is too big as it exceeds the baseline in terms
of the magnitude.
Manning, Morris, and Newhouse (1981) argue that the decision to visit a doctor at all, the
so-called contact decision, is made by the individual, whereas the number of visits is mainly
determined by the doctor. However, it could also be that the patient and the doctor jointly deter-
mine the number of visits, or that fewer visits are needed for privately insured patients because
they have invested in prevention. Furthermore, it could be that privately insured patients are
treated more intensely so that less doctor visits are necessary. This is sensible because doctors
are paid based on the number of treatments, not on the number of visits itself, and receive a
higher compensation when they treat privately insured patients. They are time constrained and
may thus focus on treating privately insured patients ﬁrst (Lungen et al., 2008; Jürges, 2009),
while spending relatively little time on publicly insured patients (Deveugele et al., 2002).
In speciﬁcation (4) we use an indicator for at least one night spent in a hospital as the de-
pendent variable. This is also a linear probability model. 7.4 percent of the publicly insured
spend at least one night in a hospital. The results indicate that there is no signiﬁcant effect of
private insurance on this (at the 5 percent level). Speciﬁcation (5) is for the number of nights
19spent in a hospital and also here we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect of private insurance (also at the 5
percent level). These ﬁndings for hospital nights are in line with those of Geil et al. (1997) and
Riphahn et al. (2003), and is intuitively plausible as the number of nights spent in a hospital can
be inﬂuenced less by the individual than the the number of doctor visits is. Finally, we ﬁnd that
private insurance has a positiveeffect on health. Again, the size of the effect seems to be too big.
7 Sensitivity analysis
Generally, we do not have to control for covariates when performing an RD analysis unless the
distributionof thecovariates changes when we movefrom the left to the right ofthe discontinuity
(Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). The measurement error in the forcing variable, however, prevents us
from performing the usual tests. However, it is still feasible to perform the analysis incorporating
a dependence of the baseline outcome and the probability to be privately insured on additional
covariates. Table 6 reports the results. They are similar to our baseline results.
Some of the studies that use GSOEP data additionally condition on health when estimat-
ing the relationship between private insurance coverage and the health outcomes (Jürges, 2009,
e.g.). For two reasons we consider it reasonable to condition on previous period’s health instead
of current health. First, one of the outcomes in this study is current period’s health so that con-
ditioning on current health is not sensible, at least for this outcome. Second, current period’s
health is likely to be endogenous. We condition on previous period’s health by re-estimating the
model for individuals who report in the previous period that their health is “satisfactory.” Table
7 contains the results.17
As a further robustness check, it is interesting to estimate the difference in the respective
expected outcome between individuals with reported values of zi slightly above zero and slightly
below zero. Battistin et al. (2009) show that under the assumption that at least some individuals
17These results were obtained using a two-step procedure to achieve convergence. This procedure is described in
the Online Appendix.
20Table 6: Speciﬁcation with covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
At least one Doctor visits Doctor visits At least one night Nights in Self-assessed
doctor visits for subsample in hospital hospital health
DLATE 0.104 -2.480*** -0.819 -0.020 -0.687 0.499***
(0.083) (0.875) (0.533) (0.039) (0.621) (0.171)
Baseline outcome 0.598*** 3.263*** 1.964*** 0.073*** 0.770*** 3.612***
(0.005) (0.053) (0.039) (0.002) (0.040) (0.011)
Years of education 0.000 -0.075*** -0.048*** -0.003*** -0.048*** 0.026***
(0.002) (0.016) (0.012) (0.001) (0.011) (0.004)
Married 0.011 -0.119 -0.053 0.003 -0.084 0.011
(0.009) (0.095) (0.068) (0.004) (0.068) (0.019)
Gender (male) -0.188*** -0.395*** -0.861*** -0.018*** -0.126* 0.032
(0.009) (0.098) (0.078) (0.005) (0.069) (0.022)
Age 0.002*** 0.036*** 0.029*** 0.001*** 0.031*** -0.025***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001)
N 23,830 14,360 23,830 23,830 23,830 23,830
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and shown in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗denote signiﬁcance at the 10,
5, and 1 % level, respectively. Sample consists of dependent employees for whom eligibility to opt out of the public
health insurance system is exclusively determined by income and who earn between 15,000 Euros less and 25,000
Euros more than the compulsory insurance threshold.
Table 7: Baseline speciﬁcation for subsample of individuals whose health in the previous period
was “satisfactory”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
At least one Doctor visits Doctor visits At least one night Nights in Self-assessed
doctor visits for subsample in hospital hospital health
DLATE -0.257 -4.421** -4.284*** -0.083 -3.220*** 0.053
(0.174) (1.869) (1.447) (0.093) (1.113) (0.234)
Baseline outcome 0.682*** 3.552*** 2.467*** 0.089*** 0.927*** 3.200***
(0.010) (0.107) (0.089) (0.006) (0.092) (0.014)
N 4,071 2,742 4,071 4,071 4,071 4.071
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and shown in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗denote signiﬁcance at the 10,
5, and 1 % level, respectively.
report their income accurately these estimates are lower bounds on the magnitude of the numer-
ator in (1). Moreover, and more importantly, they also show that then the sign is equal to the sign
of the local average treatment effect.
For this we perform separate local linear regressions to the left and to the right of 0, using
21Table 8: Local linear regression estimates of the discontinuity at the threshold
ROT half ROT twice ROT
At least 1 doctor visit 0.021 0.021 0.006
(0.027) (0.034) (0.018)
Doctor visits given at least 1 visit -0.120 -0.230 -0.162
(0.214) (0.318) (0.147)
Doctor visits -0.033 -0.105 -0.059
(0.154) (0.235) (0.101)
At least 1 night in hosp. -0.002 0.007 -0.001
(0.010) (0.014) (0.007)
Nights in hospital 0.048 0.073 0.171
(0.140) (0.232) (0.115)
Self-assessed health -0.002 -0.025 0.017
(0.035) (0.055) (0.029)
Estimates of the discontinuity that were obtained using Silverman’s rule-of-thumb
(ROT) bandwidth, as well as half and twice that bandwidth. We use a different
bandwidth to the left and to the right of the discontinuity, respectively. Standard
errorsare bootstrapped,clusteredat the individuallevel, andshownin parentheses.
Sample consists of dependent employees for whom eligibility to opt out of the
public health insurance system is exclusively determined by income and who earn
between 15,000 Euros less and 25,000Euros more than the compulsoryinsurance
threshold.
Silverman’s rule-of-thumb (ROT) bandwidth, of the respective outcome on zi. Table 8 reports
the results. In line with our baseline estimates it shows that private insurance has a big effect on
the number of doctor visits.18
Results of further robustness checks are reported in the Online Appendix. In particular, we
relax the assumption that expected outcomes are not related to income (b0 = b1 = 0), estimate
the variance of the measurement error using the two available income measures, conduct the
analysis for subsamples of individuals whose two income reports are close to one another, and
obtain estimates using an estimation sample that is more narrowly deﬁned in terms of income.
18Notably, the size of the discontinuity that is estimated here is not the local average treatment effect.
228 Conclusions
In this paper we estimate the effect of private health insurance on the number of doctor visits, the
number of nights spent in a hospital, and self-assessed health in Germany. Variation in income
around the compulsory insurance threshold generates a natural experiment which allows us to
control for selection into private insurance and estimate respective average treatment effects for
individuals who buy private insurance once they become eligible by earning enough.
We show that it is importantto account for measurement error in incomeand suggest a way to
do so. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negativeeffect of private insurance on the number of doctor visits for
those individuals who see the doctor at least once. At the same time, we ﬁnd no effect of private
health insurance on the numberof nights spent in a hospital, and a positiveeffect on self-assessed
health. This suggests that private health insurance either has a positive effect on investment in
prevention, because of the monetary incentives provided to the insured, or that privately insured
patients receive more intense or better treatment each time they visit a doctor.
Appendix A: Derivations
In this appendix we derive an expression for E(pi|z∗
i ) = Pr(pi = 1|z∗
i ). Recall that z∗
i = zi−ui,
where ui is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance s2
u, statistically independent of zi, pi
and the potential outcomes. For z∗
i < 0 we have that E(pi|z∗
i ) = 0 by deﬁnition. For z∗
i ≥ 0 we
specify E(pi|z∗
i ) to be a linear function in z∗
















The assumptions about the measurement error imply that this is equivalent to
E(pi|zi) = Pr(ui ≤ zi)·(a +bE(zi−ui|zi,ui ≤ zi)). (5)
Recall that if v is standard normally distributed then E(v|v < c)=−f (c)/F(c), which is known
as the inverse Mills ratio, where F(·) and f(·) denote the standard normal cumulative distribu-
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